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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 





STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Appeal from Appellant's conviction of robbery in 
violation of Section 76-51-1, Utah Code Annotated 
( 1953) in the Third District Court for Salt Lake Coun-
ty, Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After Appellant was released by federal habeas 
corpus from the commitment of his first prosecution, he 
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was retried before a jury for the crime of robbery. Ht 
was found guilty on June 3, 1970, and sentenced on June 
30, 1970, to an indeterminate term as provided by law 
for the crime of robbery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment entered 
by the lower court and a new trial with instructions to 
allow the jury to make a finding of fact as to if Appellant 
should be acquitted on grounds of former jeopardy. 
In the alternative, Appellant seeks a remand of the 
case to the lower Court with instructions that the com-
mitment be modified to give credit for all time Appel-
lant has been incarcerated since his arrest. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 27, 1967, Appellant was arrested on 
the charge of robbery. Appellant is indigent, and being 
unable to raise bail at any time, he has been in continuous 
incarceration since November 27, 1967. He originally 
entered a plea of not guilty, but his impatience overcame 
his desire to litigate the issue of his innocence when it 
became apparent to him that the State was denying him 
his right to a speedy trial and he was spending "dead 
time" in the County Jail for which he anticipated no 
credit if convicted. On February 13, 1968, Appellant 
therefore changed his plea to guilty and waived time for 
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passing of sentence, whereupon judgment and sentence 
were pronounced. 
On April 23, 1970, the Honorable A. Sherman 
Christensen, Judge in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, Central Division, granted Ap-
pellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the 
grounds that his plea of guilty had not been an intelli-
gent and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights. 
Appellant was subsequently retried for the same 
offense of robbery before the Honorable Aldon J. An-
derson, Third District Court for Salt Lake County, the 
Court from which the present appeal is being made. At 
this second prosecution, Appellant entered pleas of not 
guilty and former jeopardy. In connection with his de-
fense of former jeopardy, Appellant wished to present 
evidence to the effect that he had been incarcerated in 
excess of 30 months as a consequence of the charge for 
which he was being tried; that 271h months had been 
spent in state prison; and that as a practical matter, such 
periods of time approach the minimum time served for 
convictions for robbery. Over Appellant's exception, the 
trial judge did not allow Appellant to present this evi-
dence and refused to submit the issue of former jeopardy 
to the jury. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Appel-
lant was subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate 
term as provided by law for the crime of robbery. 
3 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT EVI-
DENCE OF FORMER JEOPARDY AND IN 
FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY OX 
THE ISSUE OF FORMER JEOPARDY. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, pro-
vides that no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense." This same right is provided by statute, 
77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
The prohibition against double jeopardy is guar· 
anteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Fifth Amendment double jeopardy stand-
ards are enforceable against the states through the Four· 
teenth Amendment. Benton vs. Maryland 395 U.S. 784 
( 1969). 
Double jeopardy does not generally act as an abso· 
lute bar to the re trail of a defendant who successfully 
attacks his first prosecution. The rational for this prin· 
ciple ". . . rests ultimately upon the premise that the 
original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been 
wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean. As to what· 
ever punishment has actually been suffered under the 
first conviction, that premise is, of course, an unmiti· 
gated fiction ... " North Carolina vs. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, at 721 ( 1969). 
Thus, the fiction of waiver might not infringe on a 
defendant's constitution right if it operates to waive the 
4 
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jeopardy defense only in the context of prosecution. But 
to the extent punishment, as opposed to prosecution, con-
stitutes jeopardy, even the most callus individual would 
have trouble digesting the notion that 30 months of in-
carceration can be wiped off the slate by the granting of 
a new trial. 
The Fifth Amendment concept of jeopardy in-
cludes the imposition of punishment as well as subjec-
tion to prosecution. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 
(1873). 
The holding in Pearce, supra and infra, clearly 
demonstrates that the slate is not "wiped clean" to the 
extent that punishment has already been exacted, and 
the right to a crediting for such punishment is not waived 
when a defendant seeks release from the commitment 
of a first prosecution. 
An issue of fact arises upon a plea of once in jeopar-
dy. 77-27-1 (3), Utah Code Annotated (1953). Issues 
of fact must be tried by the jury. 77-27-2, Utah Code 
Annotated ( 1953) . 
Since the time served by Appellant prior to his 
second prosecution constituted jeopardy, and since he 
did not waive his right to the defense of former jeopardy, 
the trial court erred in disallowing evidence of former 
jeopardy and in not submitting the issue to the jury. 
5 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING 
THE INDETERMINATE STATUTORY PEN. 
ALTY FOR ROBBERY, WITHOUT GIVING 
CREDIT IN THE COMMITMENT FOR THI 
TIME ALREADY SERVED BY APPELLANT 
InNorthCarolinavs.Pearce,395 U.S. 711 (1969) 
petitioner was convicted of assault with intent to rap1 
and sentenced to a prison term of 12 to 15 years. Severa 
years later his conviction was reversed on the ground 
of the unconstitutional use of his confession. He was re 
tried, convicted, and sentenced to eight years, whicl 
when added to the time he had already served amounte1 
to a longer sentence than imposed at his first trial. Th 
case reached the United States Supreme Court throug: 
a federal habeas corpus proceeding which Pearce init1 
ated. 
The Supreme Court held that the "constitutiom 
guarantee against multiple punishments for the sarn 
offense absolutely requires that punishment alread 
exacted must be fully 'credited' in imposing sentenc 
upon a new conviction for the same offense." 395 u.: 
at 718-19. 
Pearce requires that time served be credited wh€ 
imposing sentence. In terms of the opinion of the cou 
in Pearce, multiple punishment is exacted "whenev1 
punishment already endured is not fully subtracted fro 
any new sentence imposed." 395 U.S. at 718. 
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Appellant further contends that under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, credit 
must also be given Appellant for the time prior to his 
first prosecution, spent in county jail because of his in-
ability to meet the bail set. If time is not credited to Ap-
pellant for the two and one-half months spent in county 
jail awaiting trial, then he is being discriminated against 
on the basis of his financial inability to post bail. 
Appellant's argument is supported by Williams vs. 
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 {1970). In Williams the United 
States Supreme Court held that where a fine is imposed 
in addition to a maximum sentence, it is a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to imprison a convicted defendant beyond the pe-
riod of the original sentence by reason of his inability to 
pay the fine. 
JV illiams is distinguishable from the instant case in 
that Williams involved tacking time on to the end of a 
maximum sentence, rather than on the beginning of an 
indeterminate sentence, and dealt with the payment of 
fines, not bail. But neither of these distinguishable facts 
can rationally distinguish the underlying policy in Wil-
liams as applied to Appellant's situation. 
The determinative factor in Williams is that differ-
ent consequences were being imposed on different de-
fendants based on their financial ability. This same fac-
tor is present in the instant case. 
In fact, there is an element present in Appellant's 
7 
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case which makes the law even more discriminatin~ 
toward Appellant than the appellant in Williams. If a 
convicted defendant pays a fine to avoid the extension 
of imprisonment be•1f)nd the maximum sentence, that 
defendant has given .ip something and to some extent i) 
on a common footing with the indigent who is f orceJ 
into extended incarceration by reason of inability to pay 
the fine. Where a maximum sentence has been imposed, 
Williams held that such a common footing is not suffi. 
cient to avoid a violation of equal protection. A fortiori 
there is a violation of equal protection where a defendant 
who is unable to make bail is not allowed credit toward 
his commitment for time spent in county jail, for in thi~ 
case the class of people who are able to make bail may 
get by with giving up nothing but the use of their ball 
money until it is refunded upon their appearance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The trial judge erred in not allowing Appellant to 
offer evidence of the extent of his former jeopardy and 
in not submitting the issue of jeopardy to the jury. This 
error was prejudicial since it precluded Appellant from 
asserting a defense guaranteed him by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constl· 
tution and by the Utah Constitution and the statutes of 
Utah. 
The trial judge violated Appellant's Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights when he imposed the 
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statutory indeterminate sentence without crediting Ap-
pellant for time served. 
Respectfully c;ubmitted, 
VAN SCIVER, FLORENCE, 
HUTCHISON, & SHARP 
Robert Van Seiver 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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